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JUSTIFICATIONS FOR UCC ARTICLE 9’S
TREATMENT OF DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS: A
COMPARATIVE NOTE
Catherine Walsh*
INTRODUCTION
Debtor-creditor and insolvency laws in western legal traditions
generally treat a defaulting debtor’s assets as subject to liquidation by
its creditors or their insolvency representative, with the proceeds then
distributed among them in proportion to their claims. Secured
creditors seek to escape this baseline principle by bargaining in advance
for the right to have assets of their debtors in which they have
contracted for security preferentially appropriated to the payment of
their debts. Thus, a contract for security has been described as a private
bargain “between A and B that C take nothing”1 with C representing
the collectivity of the collateral-giver’s other creditors.
In view of the distributional consequences, legal systems
traditionally have found it necessary to impose certain limitations on
party autonomy in security agreements. In recent decades, these
constraints have been increasingly dismantled for creditors who take
security in what is popularly referred to as “cash collateral” — meaning
not just cash in the strict sense of hard currency but also intangible
rights that are highly liquid in the sense that the secured creditor can
almost immediately acquire their cash value.
This article focuses on cash collateral in the form of a right to
payment of money credited to an account with a bank or other
Professor, Faculty of Law, McGill University.
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Politics of Article 9: The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80
VA. L. REV. 1887, 1899 (1994).
*
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financial institution (deposit account). Secured transactions regimes in
effect in the Canadian provinces and territories traditionally have
subjected deposit accounts to the same public notice and temporal
priority rules that apply to security agreements covering other
intangible assets in the form of a monetary obligation owed to the
debtor. In contrast, deposit accounts under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code in the United States are governed by a special set of
rules organized around the concept of “control.”
The Article 9 deposit account regime is increasingly promoted
internationally. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured
Transactions is particularly notable.2 It represents the first attempt at
the international law level to articulate a comprehensive regime of
security for movable assets. The close affinity between U.C.C. Article
9 and the Guide’s recommendations is such that, in the words of
Tomáš Richter, it “could be called the ‘New York/ Vienna
consensus.’”3 Certainly, with respect to the treatment of deposit
accounts,4 the recommendations of the Guide replicate almost
completely the Article 9 rules.5
Reforms aimed at aligning the treatment of deposit accounts
in Canadian secured transactions law with the Article 9 (and
UNCITRAL) control approach have recently been proposed. As will
See UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS,
U.N.
Sales
No.
E.09.V.12
(2010),
available
at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/09-82670_EbookGuide_09-04-10English.pdf (hereinafter UNICITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE). For
ease of reference, the terminology and recommendations of the Guide are published
in a separate publication: UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED
TRANSACTIONS: TERMINOLOGY AND RECOMMENDATIONS, U.N. Sales No.
E.09.V.13 (2010), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/Terminology-andRecs.18-1-10.pdf
(hereinafter
UNCITRAL
TERMINOLOGY
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS).
3
Tomáš Richter, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Credit: A
Minskian Sequel 4 (Oct. 1, 2013) (unpublished article), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2390013.
4
Instead of “deposit account,” the UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE
uses the conceptually more accurate, but also more cumbersome, term “right to
payment of funds credited to a deposit account.” For an explanation of this term, see
UNCITRAL TERMINOLOGY AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2.
5
Id. at 49, 103-04, 125-26, 173-75.
2
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be seen, adoption of the control approach will in effect exempt secured
creditors who obtain control of a deposit account from the public
notice and temporal priority rules that until now have applied to
security rights in all types of monetary obligations. It will also result in
a departure from the basic premise of secured creditor equality implicit
in the traditional temporal priority rule by privileging the depository
bank over other secured credit providers.
The principal aim of this article is to explore the justification
for the exceptional treatment of deposit accounts under the Article 9
control approach. Parts I and II summarize the current Canadian rules
and compares them with the Article 9 regime. Part III reviews the
official justifications for the Article 9 approach and finds them less
than persuasive. Part IV explores the relatively recent push to import
the Article 9 treatment of deposit accounts into Canadian secured
transactions law and locates the reform pressure in the desire to
facilitate the use of cash collateral in the form of deposit accounts by
financial actors, notably in the derivatives and securities lending
markets. In light of that finding, Part V concludes by asking whether
privileging the extension of credit to the financial sector represents
wise policy if it comes at the potential expense of reducing the
availability of and increasing the cost of credit to the real economy.
I.

THE TRADITIONAL CANADIAN APPROACH TO THE
TREATMENT OF DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS IN SECURED
TRANSACTIONS LAW

Funds deposited to a bank account are not set aside as
belonging to the customer. Rather, they become the property of the
bank and are replaced by the obligation of the bank to pay the
equivalent amount to the customer. Thus, in general property law, a
deposit account has come to be characterized simply as a debt owed
by the bank to its customer. It constitutes a sub-species of pure
intangible property since its value is not reified in any tangible
document capable of being negotiated, such as a cheque or a
certificated investment security.6

See, e.g., Benjamin Geva, Rights in Bank Deposits and Account Balances in
Common Law Canada, 28 BANKING FIN. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2012); Clayton Bangsund, The
6
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Consistent with this general conceptualization, the secured
transactions regimes in effect in the Canadian provinces and territories7
traditionally have subjected deposit accounts to the same general rules
that apply to other intangible assets that take the form of a monetary
obligation owed to the grantor. Thus, a security right in a deposit
account must be “perfected” by public registration of a notice of the
security right to take effect against third parties8 and priority among
secured creditors is ordered temporally according to the order of
registration. 9 On the debtor’s default, the secured creditor is entitled
to collect payment of the value of the deposit account directly from
the bank with whom the deposit account is held and may then apply
the proceeds of collection in satisfaction of the obligation secured by
its security interest.10
If the bank with whom the deposit account is held wishes to
take a security interest in its customer’s account to secure an obligation
owing to it by the customer, it does not enjoy any special exemption
from these rules. Thus, the bank must register notice of its security
right and its priority against outside secured creditors who have
previously acquired a perfected security interest in the deposit account
generally will be subject to the first-to-register priority rule. The
application of that rule is subject, however, to the bank’s right, in its
capacity as the debtor on the deposit account, to set-off any obligations
owing to it by its customer that arise before it receives notice of a

Deposit Account & Chose in Action at Common Law & Under the PPSA: A Historical Review,
30 BANKING FIN. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (2014); Bruce A. Markell, From Property to Contract
and Back: An Examination of Deposit Accounts and Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 963, 966-67 (1999).
7
In the province of Quebec where the civil law tradition prevails, secured
transactions law is primarily found in the Civil Code rules governing hypothecary
security. See Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, bk. 6 (Can.). While the common
law tradition prevails in the other nine provinces and the three territories, secured
transactions law is primarily found in the Personal Property Security Acts (PPSAs)
proclaimed in force between 1976 and 2001.See, e.g., Ontario Personal Property
Security Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.10 (Can.) [hereinafter Ontario PPSA]. See generally
R.C.C. CUMING, CATHERINE WALSH & RODERICK WOOD, PERSONAL PROPERTY
SECURITY LAW (2d ed. 2012).
8 See, e.g., Ontario PPSA, supra note 7, at §§ 19, 20, 23.
9 Id. at § 30(1)(1).
10 Id. at § 61(1).
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security right that otherwise would have priority.11 The bank’s set-off
right, whether arising by operation of law or contractually, may be
exercised regardless of whether or not it concurrently holds a security
interest in the deposit account.12
II.

THE ARTICLE 9 “CONTROL” REGIME

Under Article 9, the concept of control by a secured creditor
plays a key role in the rules governing the perfection and priority of a
security right in a deposit account. Control is not a unitary concept—
its meaning varies according to whether the secured creditor is the
bank with whom the grantor maintains the deposit account or an
outside creditor.13 If the bank is the secured creditor, it automatically
has control upon its customer’s grant of security to it.14 If the secured
creditor is an outside creditor, it can obtain control either by becoming
the bank’s customer with respect to its debtor’s deposit account or by
entering into a control agreement with the bank and the debtor under
which the bank agrees that it will comply with instructions originated
by the secured creditor directing disposition of the funds in the deposit
account without further consent by the debtor.15
Obtaining control is an alternative to registration as a mode of
perfecting a security interest in deposit accounts. This is so even
though control does not give public notice of the potential existence
of the security right to creditors and other potential competing
claimants. The secured creditor’s control need not be exclusive: a
secured creditor has control even if the debtor retains the right to
direct the disposition of funds from the deposit account as if it were
unencumbered.16 Outside parties cannot require the bank to disclose
whether a security right exists in the deposit account: a bank that has
entered into a control agreement is not required to confirm the
existence of the agreement to another person unless requested to do
CUMING, WALSH & WOOD, supra note 7, at 664.
Id. at 666-67. And see infra, Section IV, for the distinction between a
mere set-off right and a set-off right that, when combined with other terms, amounts
to a security interest in substance.
13
U.C.C. § 9-104(a) (2014).
14
Id. at § 9-104(a)(1).
15
Id. at § 9-104(a)(2)-(3).
16
Id. at § 9-104(b).
11
12
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so by its customer.17 The result is a “secret lien,” the very mischief that
the general requirement for perfection was intended to alleviate.18
A secured creditor who obtains control of a deposit account
has priority over a secured creditor who perfects its security right by
registration even if registration preceded the obtaining of control.19
The privileged status accorded to security rights perfected by control
at the level of priority carries over to enforcement on default. If the
secured creditor has control by virtue of its status as the depository
bank, it may simply apply the funds credited to the deposit account to
the obligation secured by the deposit account.20 If the secured creditor
is an outside creditor who has obtained control by virtue of a control
agreement or because it has become the bank’s customer on the
account, it may instruct the bank to pay the balance on deposit.21 If,
however, the secured creditor is relying on perfection by registration
as opposed to control, it may enforce its security right only by
obtaining a court order under other law compelling the bank to pay
the funds to it.22 The secured creditor has no right to demand payment
simply on notification to the bank. In contrast, the depository bank, in
its capacity as secured creditor with automatic control, is entitled to
simply pay itself out of the funds in the account, and outside secured

Id. at § 9-342.
Lynn M. LoPucki, Arvin I. Abraham & Bernd P. Delahaye, Optimizing
English and American Security Interests, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1785, 1800 (2013);
Jonathan C. Lipson, Secrets and Liens: The End of Notice in Commercial Finance Law, 21
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 421, 426 (2005).
19
Under Article 9, control is the only method available for perfecting a
security right in a deposit account as original collateral: U.C.C. § 9-312(b)(1) (2014).
However, a security right in a deposit account perfected by control may come into
conflict with one perfected by registration where the deposit account is claimed as
proceeds of collateral perfected by public registration pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-315(c)
and (d). In that event, the security interest perfected by control has priority under
U.C.C. § 9-327(1). Under the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, while a security right
in a deposit account may be made effective against third parties by registration even
when the deposit account is original collateral (recommendation 49), the secured
creditor who has obtained control has priority even against a prior registered secured
creditor (recommendation 103). See UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2.
20
U.C.C. § 9-607(a)(4) (2014).
21
Id. at § 9-607(a)(5).
22
Id. at § 9-607, cmt. 7.
17
18
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creditors who have obtained control are likewise entitled to self-help
collection rights without the need for judicial intervention.
As between the depository bank and outside secured creditors
who seek to perfect a security right in a deposit account by control, the
control regime privileges the depository bank. The depository bank is
not obligated to enter into a control agreement with an outside secured
creditor, even if its customer so requests, and even if it does not itself
hold a security right in the account.23 If the bank does agree to enter
into a control agreement, any security right the bank obtains in the
deposit account has priority even if the control agreement was
concluded before the bank acquired its security right.24 So in practice
the outside secured creditor will also need to obtain the agreement of
the depository bank to waive its priority.
In theory, an outside secured creditor can be assured of priority
over the depository bank by relying on the alternative method of
control: becoming the bank’s customer with respect to the deposit
account.25 This method of control gives it priority over any security
interest acquired by the bank26 and terminates the bank’s set-off right
for any claims it has against the debtor.27 However, this method of
control requires the cooperation of the bank, so in practice the bank’s
consent to waive its priority is needed.28 Nor is this method of control
a feasible one for operating accounts to which the debtor needs regular
access.29
III.

OFFICIAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SPECIAL CONTROL RULES

The official justifications for the Article 9 control rules are not
particularly convincing. With respect to the priority enjoyed by control
secured creditors over those who have perfected by registration, the
Id. at § 9-342.
Id. at § 9-327(3).
25
Id. at § 9-104(a)(3).
26
Id. at § 9-327(4).
27
Id. at § 9-340(c).
28
See, e.g., Willa E. Gibson, Banks Reign Supreme Under Revised Article 9
Deposit Account Rules, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 844 (2005).
29
Markell, supra note 6, at 987; see also G.R. Warner, Deposit Accounts as
Collateral under Revised Article 9, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18 (Aug. 2000).
23
24
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Official Comment states that secured creditors “for whom the deposit
account is an integral part of the credit decision will, at a minimum,
insist upon the right to immediate access to the deposit account upon
the debtor’s default (i.e., control)” whereas those “for whom the
deposit account is less essential will not take control.”30 The
implication here seems to be that a secured creditor who demonstrates
special reliance by taking the extra steps needed to obtain control
should be rewarded for its efforts by a special priority.31 But this
justification is predicated on circular reasoning, since a secured creditor
would not have to take these extra steps if priority were instead
predicated on the basis of the order of registration of the security
rights.
With respect to the priority generally enjoyed by the bank over
outside secured creditors, the Official Comment explains that a “rule
of this kind enables banks to extend credit to their depositors without
the need to examine either the public record or their own records to
determine whether another party might have a security interest in the
deposit account.”32 But this is a conclusory statement, not a
justification. After all, all secured creditors would wish to be assured
of receiving an automatic super-priority over prior-perfected secured
creditors. Why privilege depository banks over other suppliers of
secured credit?
With respect to the automatic control enjoyed by the
depository bank by virtue of its status, the official comment states that
public notice is unnecessary since all actual and potential creditors are
always on notice that the bank may assert a claim by virtue of its setoff rights against the deposit account.33 The implication here is that
awarding automatic control and a special priority to a depository
bank’s security right does not put third parties in a more
U.C.C. § 9-327, cmt. 3 (2014).
For an argument suggesting that this is the justification for control
super-priority, see Randal C. Picker, Perfection Hierarchies and Nontemporal Priority Rules
74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1157 (1999).
32
U.C.C. § 9-327, cmt. 4 (2014).
33
Id. at § 9‐ 104, cmt. 3 (“No other form of public notice is necessary;
all actual and potential creditors of the debtor are always on notice that the bank with
which the debtor’s deposit account is maintained may assert a claim against the
deposit account.”).
30
31
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disadvantageous position than they already occupy. It is true that setoff is not a security interest and as such is not subject to any public
registration or other public notice requirement. However, a bank can
only set-off obligations already owing to it by its customer at the time
it receives notice of a competing claim.34 The concept of automatic
control, combined with the special priority accorded to the depository
bank’s security right, dispenses with the need for the bank to first
ascertain whether notice has been received before extending credit and
eliminates the potential for litigation concerning the relative timing of
the receipt of notice and the extension of credit.35 It follows that the
concept of automatic control without the need for public notice
cannot be explained simply as a neutral and logical application of the
consequences of set off. Rather, it enhances the bank’s position
relative to the set-off rights of other obligors.
With respect to the right of the bank to refuse to disclose
whether control has been obtained by an outside secured creditor, the
Official Comment explains that this protects banks “from the need to
respond to inquiries from persons other than their customers.”36 But
requiring outside secured creditors to register notice of their security
rights would equally relieve the bank from that burden while also
serving to ensure public notice to competing creditors and other
claimants.
IV.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR IMPORTING THE ARTICLE 9 CONTROL
REGIME INTO CANADIAN LAW

Writing in 2000, some Canadian commentators concluded that
there was no justification for importing the Article 9 regime for deposit
accounts into Canadian law.37 Why, they asked, should depository
institutions be exempt from the general registration requirements and
first-to-register priority rules applicable to the holders of security rights
in other intangible obligations? And why should they enjoy what
See, e.g., CUMING, WALSH & WOOD, supra note 7, at 664.
See UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 139, ¶ 144.
36
U.C.C. § 9‐ 342, cmt 2 (2014).
37
Ronald C.C. Cuming & Catherine Walsh, Revised Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: Implications for the Canadian Personal Property Security Acts, 16 BANKING
FIN. L. REV. 339, 364-68 (2001).
34
35
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amounts in effect to a veto over the ability of a debtor to give an
effective security interest in its deposit account to an outside creditor
when the existing law, including the depository bank’s rights of set-off,
would seem to offer it adequate protection against interference with
ordinary banking practices?
In recent years, the tide of opinion in Canada has swung
heavily in favor of adoption of the Article 9 control approach.38
Indeed, the province of Quebec already has introduced legislation to
that end, and reforms are pending in the other provinces and
territories.39
A significant catalyst for the pending reforms was the 2009
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Caisse populaire Desjardins
de l’Est de Drummond v. Canada.40 In that case, a customer had deposited
$200,000 with a credit union subject to contractual terms that
prevented the customer from withdrawing the deposit before the
expiry of a five-year term and entitled the credit union to set-off any
obligations owing under the line of credit it had extended to the
customer and to refuse repayment of the deposit for the duration of
the line of credit agreement.41
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that, while a mere
contractual set-off right without more is not a security interest, the
arrangement must be characterized as a security agreement in
substance when a contractual set-off right is combined with other
contractual terms designed to prevent the customer from withdrawing
or otherwise dealing with the funds in its account until its own
See Ontario Bar Association, Perfecting Security Interests in Cash Collateral
(Feb. 6, 2012), available at
https://www.oba.org/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=c020380c-6c0a-496f-b4b1b44d6ac07eb5.
39 See Michel Deschamps, Mathieu Dubord & Mary Jeanne Phelan, New
Regime in Quebec for Security on Bank Deposits and Other Monetary Claims, MCCARTHY
TETRAULT
(May
15,
2015),
http://
http://www.mccarthy.ca/article_detail.aspx?id=7105. See also ONTARIO MINISTRY
OF GOVERNMENT AND CONSUMER SERVICES, BUSINESS LAW AGENDA: PRIORITY
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REPORT 9 (2015).
40
Caisse populaire Desjardins de l’Est de Drummond v. Canada, [2009]
2 S.C.R. 94 (Can.).
41
Id.
38
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obligations to the bank are satisfied.42 Although the decision related to
the concept of security for the purposes of income tax legislation, it
was widely seen as jeopardizing the use of “cash collateral” in the form
of a customer’s right to the payment of money credited to a deposit
account in the context of derivatives and securities lending
transactions.43 Participants in these markets had thought they might
protect their priority in “cash collateral” transactions by relying on
“flawed asset” contractual arrangements under which the customer
agrees that money deposited by the customer is not repayable until the
occurrence of specified events. If these arrangements, as the Drummond
case correctly implied,44 are characterized as giving rise to a security
right in substance, it follows that they are required to be perfected by
registration, and will be subordinated to any prior-registered
competing security right unless the secured creditor obtains a
subordination agreement.45 In contrast, adoption of an Article 9
control approach would enable secured creditors and particularly
banks to obtain a first ranking security right to deposit accounts in cash
collateral transactions without the need to register and without any risk
of subordination to prior-registered secured creditors. Consequently,
in the wake of the Drummond decision, the financial industry stepped
up its lobbying efforts to import the Article 9 treatment of deposit
accounts into Canadian law46 with success now imminent.

Id.
See, e.g., Anthony Duggan, The Australian PPSA From a Canadian
Perspective: Some Comparative Reflections 11-13 (U. Toronto Law, Working Paper No.
2014-03, 2014), available at
http://www.law.utoronto.ca/utfl_file/count/documents/Duggan/WPS%2020143.pdf.
44
CUMING, WALSH & WOOD, supra note 7, at 667, 143-46.
45
Duggan, supra note 43, at 12.
46
See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION
(ISDA), ISDA LETTER TO ALBERTA AND ONTARIO GOVERNMENTS RE PROPOSAL
FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE TREATMENT OF DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS UNDER THE PPSA
(Apr. 13, 2010), available at http://www2.isda.org/regions/canada/page/3.
42
43
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CONCLUSION
Whatever the official explanation for the Article 9 control
approach, the recent Canadian experience suggests that its primary
purpose is to facilitate the use of deposit accounts in cash collateral
transactions in derivatives and other financial markets. Dispensing
with the public registration requirements and registration based
temporal priority rules that traditionally have informed Canadian
secured transactions law will come at a cost to creditors in the real
economy. For example, secured creditors who finance a commercial
debtor’s operating costs, including its acquisition of inventory, will no
longer be able to rely on registration to give them an enforceable
security right in the debtor’s deposit account. They will need to
undergo the additional expense and effort of obtaining control,
including negotiating the agreement of the bank with which the
account is maintained to waive its own priority. Unsecured creditors
are also disadvantaged. At present, they can determine whether it is
worth their time and expense to obtain a judgment and garnish their
debtors’ deposit accounts by searching the registry to verify whether
any security rights have been granted in those accounts. While these
creditors still would be subject to any set off rights enjoyed by the
bank, they would at least know that those set off rights would be
limited to the credit extended to the bank at the time of enforcement
against the bank.
Recent scholarship argues that, while facilitating the extension
of secured credit has a positive impact on economic growth when it is
directed to the real economy, its effect when channeled to the financial
economy may be destructive, generating price bubbles and subsequent
debt deflation.47 If that argument is correct, we may yet come to regret
dismantling the general requirements of secured transactions law in
order to facilitate the extension of credit based on deposit account
collateral in financial markets48 while increasing the cost of and thereby

For an analysis of the scholarship, see Richter, supra note 3.
Id. at 10-11 (discussing the Financial Collateral Directive in the
European Union, which, in a similar vein to the Article 9 control regime, seeks to
exempt financial collateral from most of the formal requirements traditionally
imposed on security arrangements).
47
48
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diminishing the extension of credit to financers of real economy
services and products.49

49 This is not to reject altogether the proposition that some protection of
the finality of ‘cash collateral’ transactions in financial markets may be justified to
contain systemic risk. Rather, it is a plea for a more nuanced and targeted modality.
In this respect, consider, for example, the amendments effected to the Canadian
Payment Clearing and Settlement Act (S.C. 1996, c. 6, Sch.) in 2012 to add a provision (s.
8(1)(c)) to protect the finality of payments made or property delivered or transferred
“in accordance with the settlement rules of designated clearing and settlement
systems” notwithstanding anything in any Canadian or provincial statute (including
provincial secured transactions statutes).
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